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Abstract
Building on an auction model, we examine the economic consequences of audit retendering,
under which the incumbent auditor in auction possesses both an information advantage and
knowledge advantage over outside auditors. Audit retendering allows the rm to retain the
incumbent auditor with positive probability, but expect to pay information rent to the incumbent
auditor due to his information advantage over outside auditors. In equilibrium, auditor switching
(or no switching) under audit retendering conveys additional information to investors, and
therefore the informativeness of the audit report under audit retendering is always greater
than that under mandatory auditor rotation. We identify conditions under which client rms
may benet from audit retendering. Our ndings shed light on the recent European Union
Audit Reform, which adopts audit retendering as an alternative to auditor rotation, and have
implications to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which are evaluating the
proposed mandatory auditor rotation.
Keywords: Audit retendering; Auditor rotation; Audit fee; Audit quality; EU Audit Reform
JEL Classication: M41, M48
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that the client-auditor relation tends to be long.1 The regulators are
concerned that long client-auditor relation impedes the audit market competition and may lead to
a familiarity threat that erodes the auditor independence. Most prior research, however, does not
nd evidence that audit rm independence decreases over longer tenure, and some even nd that
long tenure improves audit quality (Defond and Zhang, 2014). Mandatory auditor rotation, as a
solution to improve the auditor independence by cutting the long tenure abruptly, has been subject
to critiques of losing client-specic knowledge from prior engagements after an auditor switching
(Reid and Carcello, 2017).2 This knowledge deciency hampers a new auditor's eectiveness of
audit processes and may result in a deadweight loss to society (GAO, 2003) or impair corporate
investment eciency (Lu and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). In the U.S., after issuing the concept
release on mandatory auditor rotation in 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) encountered erce resistance from companies, auditors, and legislators, and eventually
abandoned its auditor rotation project.3
While enhancing auditor independence and audit quality remains as the primary concern for
the regulator, it is not clear whether mandatory auditor rotation is the best mechanism to achieve
these objectives. One interesting recent development is that some regulators have proposed audit
retendering to promote eective competition in the audit market.4 The U.K. Competition Com-
mission has mandated an order, eective on January 1, 2015, that requires FTSE 350 companies to
1A recent study shows that in 2012 about 25 % of FTSE 350 companies have the same auditor for more than 20
years and 50% of FTSE 350 companies have the same auditor for more than 10 years. See \Developments in Audit
2018" issued by U.K. Financial Reporting Council.
2Reid and Carcello (2017) nd that as a new auditor may not retain client-specic knowledge, the market re-
acts negatively (positively) to events contemplated by the PCAOB between 2011 and 2013 that increased (de-
creased) the likelihood of rotation. PwC argues that mandatory auditor rotation will impair audit quality due to
disruptive changes and the loss of knowledge ( https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/publications/assets/pwc-
pointofview-mandatoryrotation.pdf).
3In June 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill to prohibit the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) from implementing mandating audit rm rotation (See Cohn, 2013). PCAOB
chairman James Doty claimed in 2014 that, \We don't have an active project or work going on within the board to
move forward on a term limit for auditors"(http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/02/05/pcaobs-auditor-rotation-project-is-
essentially-dead/).
4In Appendix I, we present two real-world examples of audit tendering: GlaxoSmithKline in the U.K. and PPL
corporation in the U.S. Most U.K. rms report similar audit tendering processes as GlaxoSmithKline.
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retender their audits every 10 years.5 The European Union (EU) allows the period of mandatory
auditor rotation to be extended to 20 years if the audit engagement is retendered or put out to bid
at the end of 10 years (Tysiac, 2014).6 Several other countries have also enforced audit retendering.7
Given that prior research on mandatory auditor rotation has primarily focused on whether
the regulation helps improve the auditor independence, the introduction of mandatory auditor re-
tendering brings a new angle to examine the regulation and economic trade-os to shorten the audit
tenure through auditor retendering. An obvious advantage of auditor retendering over mandatory
auditor rotation is the possibility of retaining the incumbent auditor's knowledge advantage.8 But
more importantly, auditor retendering does not necessarily suer from the auditor independence
problem. As pointed out by Defond and Zhang (2014), the regulators are concerned about the
\perceived threats" to the auditor independence. Under auditor retendering, the incumbent au-
ditor is retained through a competitive tendering process, which makes it harder for the rm to
bring credible threat or pressure to the auditor to compromise audit opinions if such a retendering
mechanism is in place. Laura Carstensen, Deputy Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission,
argued \more frequent tendering will ensure that companies make regular and well informed as-
sessments of whether their incumbent auditor is competitive and will open up more opportunities
for other rms to compete. A more dynamic, contestable market will reduce the dangers that come
with over familiarity and long, unchallenged tenures."9
In this paper, we analytically model audit retendering using an auction model with informa-
tion asymmetry between incumbent and entrant (outside) auditors, and compare with a model
5The full name of the order is \The Statutory Audit Services for Large Companies Market Investigation (Manda-
tory Use of Competitive Tender Processes and Audit Committee Responsibilities) Order 2014." See full details of the
nal report at https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases /statutory-audit-services-market-investigation.
6Horton et al. (2018) nd that investors react positively to the proposals leading the EU Audit Reform.
7Outside the EU, China also has a policy, albeit on a smaller scale, that features both retendering and rotation in
state-owned nancial companies. In August 2010, the Ministry of Finance in China announced that state-owned nan-
cial companies must reselect an auditor once every three years through a tender process, and stipulated that the same
audit rm cannot be used for more than ve straight years. http://english.caixin.com/2012-08-27/100429155.html.
8During the PCAOB's public meeting on auditor independence and audit rm rotation on October 18,
2012, Mark Nelson, Professor at Cornell University, stated that, \An advantage of retendering is that
clients could choose to retain auditors if they believed the auditor had a particular knowledge advan-
tage."(https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket037/ps Nelson.pdf)
9http://www.internationalaccountingbulletin.com/news/no-mandatory-audit-rm-rotation-but-ve-year-audit-
retendering-for-uk-ftse350-cc/.
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of mandatory auditor rotation. Thus we oer fresh insights into understanding the outcomes of
audit engagement under auditor retendering. For example, to what extent could audit knowledge
be retained via audit retendering? How does the audit retendering aect audit quality and the
informativeness of audit report? What are the eects on audit fees and audit quality upon switch-
ing to an outside auditor under auditor retendering? What are the economic trade-os between
auditor retendering and mandatory auditor rotation regimes? To our knowledge, there has been no
prior study in the extant literature that examines the theoretical framework of auditor retendering,
and analyzes economic tradeos of auditor retendering and mandatory auditor rotation regimes
directly.
Specically, we consider a model with three sets of risk neutral players: a client rm, auditors,
and prospective investors of the rm. The client rm expects to issue nancial statements that
must be audited by one auditor. Events unfold in the following sequence. A rm seeks to raise
equity capital to nance a project by selling a portion of the project's payo to outside investors.
After the audit engagement, an auditor exerts eort and issues an audit report about the state of
the project. The marginal cost of the audit eort depends on the rm's control risk, which is only
observable to the engaged auditor after conducting the audit planning.10 The project is funded
only if the audit report is good. The auditor's report contains a type-II error|a bad state may not
be detected by the auditor. After observing the auditor's good report, investors require a fraction
of the project return to break even. Investors receive their share of the cash ows if the project
succeeds, otherwise investors receive zero.
There are two types of auditors in the market: an incumbent auditor who has prior engagement
with the client rm, and an entrant auditor with no prior engagement. The incumbent and entrant
auditors dier from two distinctive sources. First, the incumbent observes the client rm's control
risk through prior experience with the client rm, whereas the entrant auditor knows only the dis-
10According to SAS No.107 (AICPA, 2006), control risk refers to the risk of a material misstatement in the
nancial statements arising to the absence or failure in the operation of relevant controls of the entity. Firms must
have sucient internal controls in place to prevent and detect instances of fraud and error. When the audit entity
does not have adequate internal controls to prevent and detect instances of fraud and error in the nancial statements,
control risk is considered to be high.
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tribution. Thus there exists information asymmetry between the incumbent and entrant auditors.
We refer to this dierence as the incumbent auditor's information advantage. Second, the incum-
bent auditor possesses rm-specic knowledge learned from the prior engagement, which lowers his
marginal cost of auditing a high-risk rm. We refer to this as the incumbent auditor's knowledge
advantage. We assume that the audit market is competitive, and thus the entrant auditor without
information or knowledge advantage earns zero prot.
The bidding game follows the standard rst-price bidding with asymmetrically informed bidders
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983). Both the informed incumbent and uninformed entrant auditors
submit sealed bids to compete for the audit engagement, and the rm accepts the lowest bid. In
equilibrium, both bidders randomize their bids over the range between the expected audit cost
and the maximum audit cost for the entrant. The entrant earns zero prot on average, while the
incumbent earns strictly positive prot (information rent) because of his information advantage
and knowledge advantage. On average, the audit fee from the outside auditor is lower than that
from the incumbent auditor.
In equilibrium, a high-control-risk client rm is more likely to switch to the outside auditor
than a low-control-risk rm: observing a switch under audit retendering conveys information to
investors about the rm's unobservable control risk. Therefore the informativeness of the report
issued by the incumbent auditor is higher than that issued by the outside auditor, because the
investors perceive that the rm's control risk is more likely to be high (and hence a greater type-
II error) given auditor switching, and that the outside auditor's audit quality is lower than the
incumbent due to knowledge deciency in the high-control-risk rm. The investors thus request a
lower fraction when observing the good report from the incumbent auditor than from the outside
auditor. Interestingly, our analytical results are supported by recent empirical evidence by Hallman
et al. (2018) that competitive bidding improves incumbent auditors' audit quality proxied by the
likelihood of subsequent nancial restatements.
Our model highlights the cost and benet of competitive tendering process when auditors are
asymmetrically informed about the client rm's control risk at the time of bidding. The regulators,
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who intend to introduce audit retendering to break the long tenure and promote audit market
competition, need to be aware of the nature of the tendering process. That is, the audit retendering
process cannot achieve perfect competition, simply because incumbent auditors inevitably gain
information advantage over outside auditors that allow them to obtain positive information rent.
Thus we focus on the economic trade-o between the knowledge retention and information rent
under audit retendering, and compare those trade-os with mandatory auditor rotation regime.
Under mandatory auditor rotation, the incumbent auditor is not allowed to compete for the
next-period engagement; an entrant auditor makes an oer that covers the expected costs and
earns zero prot in a competitive audit market. As the incumbent cannot continue the audit
engagement with the client rm, the expected audit quality by the entrant auditor is always lower
than that of the incumbent, hence reducing investment eciency. Furthermore, because the auditor
switch conveys information about the rm's risk, the incumbent auditor's report under the audit
retendering regime is more informative than the auditor report issued under the mandatory rotation
regime; whereas the entrant auditor's report is less informative than the one issued under the
mandatory rotation regime.
In terms of the expected audit fee and the audit report informativeness under two regimes,
we also nd interesting results. On the one hand, the expected audit fee is always lower under
mandatory auditor rotation than under auditor retendering, due to the information rent earned by
the incumbent auditor in the latter regime. On the other hand, the average auditor report informa-
tiveness under audit retendering is always higher than that under mandatory auditor rotation, due
to the incumbent auditor's higher audit quality from his knowledge advantage. The client rm's
expected payo depends on the expected audit fee and the investment loss due to the auditor's
type-II error. Thus, in comparing these two regimes, the economic trade-o depends on information
rent and audit eciency. We show that the client rm is better o under audit retendering, when
the incumbent's knowledge advantage is more important, or when the incumbent's information
advantage (rent) is less costly.
In our model, we focus on the economic tradeos between information rent and client-knowledge
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retention under these two regimes. Though we do not explicitly model the auditor independence
under auditor retendering, we point out that auditor retendering, with its advantage of potentially
retaining client-specic knowledge, does not necessarily suer the independence problem because
the auditor is selected through a competitive tendering process. In our model, information rent
under auditor retendering comes from asymmetric information among bidders and is therefore
inevitable, as long as the incumbent auditor is allowed to participate in the audit tender. The rm,
without observing the control risk, accepts the lowest bid from the auditors and switches only when
an outside auditor bids a lower price than the incumbent. Thus, client rms cannot use information
rent as a credible threat to terminate the audit service to induce compromisation, dierent from the
incumbent rent from xed known switching cost in DeAngelo (1981). We provide some discussion
about the problem in the last part.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst study to formally analyze the auditor
retendering provisions in the EU Audit Reform. We contribute to the extant auditor rotation
literature by introducing this new retendering feature to academic discussions. Our theoretical
characterization of audit retendering regime and its comparison with mandatory auditor rotation
regime generates testable empirical hypotheses for EU rms. Our model predicts that under auditor
retendering, both audit fee and audit quality upon auditor switching are lower than the ones without
auditor switching, and these results are driven by both information and knowledge advantages of
the incumbent auditor over the outside auditor. Our model also predicts that, client rms are
more likely to benet from audit retendering than mandatory auditor rotation when they are
more homogeneous in terms of control risk, when they have higher control risk, when the size
of investment is larger, or when incumbent auditors have industry or geographical expertise in
auditing the client rms. Conditional on the size of investment, a rm's expected payo under
audit retendering is higher than under auditor rotation when legal liability is high.
Our paper also has policy implications, as the model we develop not only provides useful feed-
back regarding the EU Audit Reform, but also sheds light on the related PCAOB deliberations in
the U.S. If the regulator concerns equally about the client rm's and the auditor's payos, then
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the auditor retendering regime strictly dominates the mandatory auditor rotation regime. This is
because information rent simply represents a surplus split between the client rm and the auditor
and does not aect the social welfare, while the audit quality under the auditor retendering regime
is strictly higher than the mandatory rotation regime. Otherwise, if the regulator cares more about
the client rm's payo, then mandatory auditor rotation may be benecial especially when infor-
mation rent is very costly to the client rm. These results may shed light on the PCAOB's decision
in whether or not to adopt mandatory auditor rotation or consider alternative mechanisms like
audit retendering in the U.S.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies in the literature.
Section 3 presents the structure and ingredients of the model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium
under the audit retendering regime. Section 5 establishes the equilibrium audit quality and audit
fees under the mandatory auditor rotation regime. Section 6 compares the two regimes. Section 7
discusses auditor independence and other related issues, and Section 8 concludes. We relegate all
proofs to Appendix II.
2 Related Literature
In this section, we review four strands of literature and discuss how our paper ts into each strand.
The rst strand has paid much attention to mandatory auditor rotation. By contrast, we focus
on audit retendering, a new provision in the EU audit reforms. This key feature distinguishes
our paper from related studies on mandatory auditor rotation. Lu and Sivaramakrishnan (2009)
studied the interaction between auditor rotation and opinion shopping, and showed that when
rms engage in opinion shopping, mandatory auditor rotation may impair investment eciency.
By contrast, Dordzhieva (2018) showed that mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor
independence, because mandatory rotation weakens the disciplining eect of auditor tenure, and
therefore provides auditors with an opportunity to discipline an auditor's decision to accommodate
a client, thereby ironically making the initial decision to compromise independence comparatively
less costly. Dopuch et al. (2001) showed that mandatory auditor rotation decreases investment in
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an experimental setting. Empirically, Kwon et al. (2014) suggested that mandatory audit rm
rotation increases the cost for audit rms and clients, while having no discernable positive eect on
audit quality. Cameron et al. (2016) observed results consistent with an increase in audit quality
perception prior to mandatory auditor rotation. Gerakos and Syverson (2015) estimated that for
U.S. publicly traded rms, mandatory audit rm rotation would induce consumer surplus losses of
approximately $2.7 billion if rotation were required after 10 years and $4.7-5.0 billion if after only
four years. Inspired by the recent EU audit reforms, we take a dierent approach by examining a
substitute regime of audit retendering. Relative to auditor rotation, audit retendering can result
in higher audit fees but more informative audit reports. Thus, our study adds to the literature by
showing that audit retendering may be a credible alternative to auditor rotation and by identifying
the conditions under which client rms may benet from audit retendering.11 To our knowledge,
there have been no empirical studies on the economic consequences of audit retendering.
The second strand is related to auditor tenure. Conducted in countries with only voluntary au-
ditor switches, these studies generate indirect inferences pertaining to mandatory auditor rotation.
Johnson and Lys (1990) argued that auditors obtain competitive advantages through specializa-
tion, and clients can lose client-specic knowledge if they change auditors. Consistent with this
intuition, lawsuits against auditors and fraudulent nancial reporting have been found to be more
likely during early periods of auditor tenure (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Carcello and Nagy,
2004). In addition, longer audit tenure is found to mitigate extreme earnings manipulations (John-
son et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Chen et al., 2008), to lower the cost of
borrowing (Mansi et al., 2004), and to reduce acquiescence to the client (Bamber and Iyer, 2007).
Taken together, these studies imply that mandatory auditor rotation may be detrimental to audit
quality due to the loss of client-specic knowledge. In our model, since the incumbent auditor may
win the audit engagement, audit retendering may preserve valuable client-specic knowledge, thus
overcoming the main weakness associated with mandatory auditor rotation.
The third strand of literature analyzes competition among audit rms. Our paper focuses on
11Specic empirical implications are provided in Section 4.4.
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analyzing a competitive bidding model in the presence of asymmetric information between the
incumbent and entrant auditors. The bargaining power of the incumbent auditor is endogenously
determined by the competition from an uninformed bidder. The focus on audit retendering distin-
guishes our paper from the extant literature. Simunic (1980) explained that the eect of monopoly
pricing on observable audit fees depends on the price elasticity of demand implicit in the client's
cost minimization problem. DeAngelo (1981) developed a simple multi-period (perpetuity) audit
pricing model and argued that low-balling arises because switching cost allows auditors to charge
\quasi-rents" on continuing engagements. Dye (1991) argued that low-balling exists because these
quasi-rents cannot be fully disclosed. Magee and Tseng (1990) showed that the auditor's value of
incumbency presents a threat to independence only under limited circumstances. Specically, when
auditors have all bargaining power, client rms have nothing to gain by threatening termination
of incumbent auditors. Kanodia and Mukherji (1994) argued that low-balling may arise from a
combination of the auditor's private information and switching costs. Gigler and Penno (1995)
argued that cost dierences among auditors can be a source of economic rents to the incumbent
auditor. Such imperfect competition may induce clients to underinvest in their accounting systems
and to accept the incumbent auditor's management advisory service, even if a rival auditor submits
a lower bid. Morgan and Stocken (1998) found that equilibrium audit fees may not fully reect a
client's business risk, because auditors can learn about the business risk associated with the client
over the course of the audit engagement.
The fourth strand examines the economic impact of auditor liability on a rm's investment
decisions (e.g., Antle and Nalebu, 1991; Schwartz, 1997; and Lu and Sapra, 2009). These papers
typically model a capital market valuation rule, an auditor's attestation strategy, and a client rm's
investment decision. In these papers, because there is no information asymmetry, the auditor's role
is not to verify a rm's strategic report, but rather to identify the nature of the rm's operational
activities. Naturally, the equilibrium investment level depends on a rm's audit fees/liability ratio.
A low fee-to-liability ratio makes an auditor more conservative, which, in turn, reduces audit quality
and therefore decreases investment eciency. Similarly, Laux and Newman (2010) analyzed the
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eect of auditor liability on client acceptance. In their setting, the source of potential over- or
under- investment is the auditor's moral hazard problem with respect to the client evaluation task.
By contrast, we model a capital market valuation in the presence of information asymmetry between
incumbent and entrant auditors. Audit retendering aects auditors' attestation eorts, and thus
investors' valuation rule.
3 The Model
We consider a one-period model with three sets of risk neutral players: a client rm, auditors, and
prospective investors At date 0, the rm seeks to raise capital K to start a project by selling an 
2 [0; 1] proportion of the project's payo to outside investors. The project has two possible states
i 2 fG;Bg. With a probability p 2 (0; 1); the project state is good and generates a return (cash
ow) of R, whereas with a probability 1  p, it is a bad project and yields zero future return. The
project state i 2 fG;Bg is independent and identically distributed in each investment period. The
probability p is common knowledge. We further assume that pR > K so that investors would invest
in the project in each period without knowing the project state.
Neither the rm nor investors can observe the project state, but the rm can hire an auditor
to issue an audited report with respect to the project state|audited nancial statements|before
raising capital from investors. The rm pays the auditor a non-contingent fee, denoted as F , for the
audit service. After the auditor becomes engaged, he proceeds to conduct the audit by choosing an
unobservable audit eort q 2 (0; 1] and obtains a binary signal j 2 fg; bg about the project state.
We assume that the auditor makes no mistake in detecting a good project (i.e., there is no type-I
error), however, he may fail to detect a bad project depending on his audit eort (i.e., there may
be a type-II error).12 The level of audit eort q determines the audit quality, as represented by the
type-II error of the audit report. Specically, we have
Pr(bjB) = q; Pr(gjG) = 1: (1)
12A similar audit technology was assumed in Dye (1993, 1995), Schwartz (1997), Chan and Pae (1998), Hillegeist
(1999), Radhakrishnan (1999), Chan and Wong (2002), and Ye and Simumic (2010).
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Thus, although a bad audit report is perfectly informative about the project's bad state, a good
audit report is a noisy signal about the project's good state. An increase in the audit quality q
reduces the type-II error in the audit report.
The audit eort cost depends on the auditor type and the control risk of the client. As a
prior, the control risk (r) can be either high (r = h) with an ex-ante probability  2 (0; 1), or low
(r = l) with a probably 1   . A client rm's control risk does not change throughout the audit
engagement, but it is unknown to both the rm and the auditor prior to the audit engagement.13
However the auditor can perfectly observe the true control risk during an audit engagement.14 After
the engagement, an auditor will conduct audit planning, which ensures that appropriate attention
is devoted to important areas and potential problems are promptly identied, and that audit work
is completed expeditiously and properly coordinated. Thus, any engaged auditor can perfectly
observe the client's control risk r through audit planning before actually exerting audit eort.
There are two types of auditors in the market who compete for the audit service of the current
period: an incumbent (inside) auditor and an entrant (outside) auditor from the competitive audit
market. The incumbent auditor is the existing auditor who has performed the audit service in the
previous period, which we do not model. The incumbent has already observed the rm's control
risk before engaging, while the outside auditor cannot.
Besides the informational advantage, the incumbent auditor also gains rm-specic knowledge
or expertise that allows him to conduct the audit more eciently. We use C(q; r; a) = car (q) to
denote the cost of the audit eort for a type a auditor engaging in a rm with control risk r, where
a 2 fI;Og indicates the auditor's type being either an incumbent (I) or an outside entrant auditor
(O), and q is the audit eort level. The rst part of the audit eort cost represents the marginal
cost of audit eort car , which diers across dierent types of auditors for rms with dierent control
risks. The second part  (q) represents the audit production cost when exerting eort q. We make
13The assumption that the rm has no private information is common in the auditing literature; see for example,
Dye (1993, 1995), Schwartz (1997), Chan and Pae (1998), Chan and Wong (2002), Laux and Newman (2010) and Lu
and Sapra (2009).
14See also Kanodia and Mukherji (1994). In Section 7, we discuss the case in which an entrant auditor may ex
ante be partially informed about the client's control risk either through nancial statements or from prior industry
experience.
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the following standard assumptions about  :  (0) = 0,  0 > 0 (but  0(0) = 0),  00 > 0, and
 000 = 0. For simplicity, we adopt a quadratic function  (q) = q2=2, which is commonly used in the
literature and satises all of the aforementioned assumptions.15 The marginal cost of audit eort
car satises the following condition:
cOl = c
I
l < c
I
h < c
O
h : (2)
That is, when the control risk is low, the incumbent and entrant auditors both incur the same audit
cost|cIl = c
O
l  cl. When the control risk is high, it is more costly to conduct the audit for both
types of auditors, and even more so for the entrant auditor|cl < c
I
h < c
O
h  ch. This assumption
implies that when the control risk is high due to high complexity of accounting transactions, it is less
costly for the incumbent auditor to conduct the audit than the entrant auditor, due to the knowledge
learning from prior experience with the client rm. We call this the \knowledge advantage" of the
incumbent auditor. However, when the control risk is low, the incumbent auditor has no advantage
over the entrant auditor.16
An audit failure occurs if the auditor does not detect material misstatements in the nancial
statements|if the auditor issues a good report g upon a bad project state B. In case of an audit
failure, the rm goes bankrupt and is unable to pay any damage to investors, and investors sue the
auditor. The auditor's possible legal costs may include a damage penalty to investors and litigation
costs through the court, legal fees, and opportunity costs of time spent in court.17 We denote the
auditor's litigation cost when a type-II audit failure occurs by L. For simplicity, we normalize the
15See Chan and Pae (1998) and Laux and Newman (2010).
16Our goal is to highlight the economic eects of the incumbent's knowledge advantage. It is plausible that the
incumbent may also have knowledge advantage when the control risk is low. The economic trade-o documented
herein is not aected by this assumption and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
17We assume investors can sue the auditor but not the rm. We adopt this assumption for two reasons. First, this
assumption simplies the analysis, permitting us to avoid questions of how to divide damage payments between a
rm and its auditor. In addition, it makes the signaling problem more signicant because the court system cannot
directly punish a rm for lying. However, because the audit fee is determined competitively, it will reect any
expected damage payment; thus, ex ante, the auditor's expected utility does not depend on the way damages are
assigned. Further, we assume penalties are imposed on the auditor but not on the rm. In general, although both
the auditor and rm are subject to penalties if the auditor does not detect misstatements, in an audit failure, the
rm is often bankrupt, whereas the auditor has \deep pockets." Assuming penalties on the auditor but not the rm
is an extreme case capturing this dierential ability to pay the penalty. This assumption is not uncommon in the
literature (see, e.g., Dye (1993, 1995), Chan and Pae (1998), and Schwartz (1997), and Laux and Newman (2010)).
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damage penalty to zero, and thus the investors in our model do not receive any part of L.18 We
also assume the audit litigation cost L is not too large, such that the audit eort q is smaller than
one in equilibrium.19
4 Audit Retendering
In this section, we consider the case in which the client rm is required to retender its audit
engagement for each period. We consider a single-period model, assuming that the auditor engaged
in the prior period always participates in the tendering process for the next period's audit service.
As such, there are two types of auditors in the audit retendering process: the existing incumbent
(inside) auditor and a representative entrant (outside) auditor from the competitive audit market.
The incumbent auditor can perfectly observe the control risk by learning through the prior audit
engagement with the client rm, while the entrant auditor cannot observe the control risk and
only knows the prior distribution of the control risk . Hence the incumbent auditor has both an
informational advantage and a knowledge advantage over the entrant auditor.
The timing of the events is as follows.
 Date 1: the incumbent and entrant auditors simultaneously submit a sealed bid (stated as an
audit fee) to the client rm based on their own information sets. The rm accepts the lower
bid between the two oers and initiates the audit engagement.20
 Date 2: the engaged auditor chooses the audit eort and issues an audit report.
 Date 3: investors observe the auditor's report as well as the auditor's type|whether an
auditor switch has occurred through the retendering process. If the audit report is b, the
project is not funded and the game ends. Only when a good report g is issued are investors
18Our assumption is consistent with prior literature that shows the damage payment has no direct eects on the
audit eort (Laux and Newman, 2010). Our analysis does not change if we allow investors to receive a non-zero
penalty payment from the auditor.
19The exact conditions will be presented in Section 5.
20In practice, because of the heterogeneity among auditors, rms may consider other factors, such as industry
experience and capacity of the proposed audit team, to select a new auditor. Please refer to the discussion in Section
7.
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willing to provide the capital through shares of the project's return. The project is funded
by selling a share of the rm to investors.
 Date 4: provided that the project is funded, the cash ow is realized. In case of success,
investors receive an a portion of the cash ow R. In case of failure, investors receive zero.
4.1 The Bidding Game
We now solve the auditor's bidding game on Date 1. The bidding game follows the standard rst-
price bidding with asymmetrically informed bidders (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, et al., 1983). To obtain
the equilibrium bidding strategies, we note that the bid submitted by each type of auditor should
at least cover their expected cost|the audit liability sum the cost of audit eort. Hence before
solving the bidding game, we need to solve backwards each auditor's optimal eort after winning
the engagement on Date 2.
The winning auditor's problem. On Date 2, the winning auditor perfectly observes the
control risk of the client rm after the audit engagement, and chooses eort qar , a 2 fI;Og; to
maximize the expected payo. For any given bid F , the winning auditor's expected payo is given
by F  war (q), where war (q) is the expected total audit cost for the client rm with the control risk
r 2 fl; hg. The total audit cost war (q) is the cost of audit eort plus the expected litigation cost.
The cost of eort depends on the control risk r 2 fl; hg and on the type of the auditors a 2 fI;Og.
A litigation cost is only incurred when a type-II error exists. Therefore, the expected total audit
cost is
war (q) = (1  q)(1  p)L+ car (q):
Thus, the auditor chooses the optimal eort by solving the following problem:
qar 2 argmax
q
F   (1  q)(1  p)L  car (q);
) qar =
(1  p)L
car
: (3)
Recall the assumption in (2), cl  cOl = cIl < cIh < cOh  ch, that is, the incumbent auditor has a
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lower marginal cost than the entrant in conducting the audit service for the high-risk client rm,
but not for the low-risk client. It is intuitive to see that qOl = q
I
l > q
I
h > q
O
h . The incumbent
auditor's optimal eort is strictly higher than the entrant's when auditing the high-risk client rm.
Given the equilibrium audit eort qar , the type-a auditor's total cost of audit engagement for the
client with risk r is given by war = (1  qar )(1  p)L+ car (qar ). To simplify notations, we dene the
entrant's expected audit cost wl  wOl and wh  wOh . Note that the incumbent's expected audit
cost is wIl = wl for the low-risk client and is w
I
h for the high-risk client, where wl < w
I
h < wh. Denote
by w the entrant auditor's expected total cost prior to the audit engagement, which represents the
minimum audit fee that the entrant auditor, not observing the true control risk, is willing to bid
in order to break even, and we have w  wh + (1  )wl:
The auditors' bidding problem. We are now ready to solve the equilibrium bidding strate-
gies of the incumbent and entrant auditors on Date 1. LetGO(F ) denote the cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f) of the bid FO from the uninformed entrant auditor, and G
r
I(F ) denote the c.d.f.
of the bid F rI from the informed incumbent auditor. The uninformed entrant auditor, without
observing the rm's control risk, maximizes her overall expected payo given the bidding strategy
of the incumbent,
UO(F ) = 
Z
(1 GhI (F ))(F   wh)gO(F )dF + (1  )
Z
(1 GlI(F ))(F   wl)gO(F )dF; (4)
where wr is the expected audit cost for the entrant auditor for the rm with the control risk r. The
entrant auditor wins the bid whenever the bidding price F is below the incumbent's bid, which
follows a distribution of GrI(:). Thus, the probability that the entrant auditor wins is given by
Pr(F rI > F ) = 1   GrI(F ) in the rm with the control risk r. When bidding any price F , the
entrant auditor's payo is given by the probability of winning at a price F multiplied by the audit
fee minus the expected audit cost wr (i.e., F  wr). We then take the expectation of the payo over
the entire bidding range of her strategy, which we will discuss later, and obtain the payo function
in (4).
By contrast, the incumbent auditor observes the control risk r and maximizes his expected
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payo in each type of rm given the entrant's bidding strategy. The incumbent's payos are given
by, respectively,
UhI (F ) =
Z
Pr(FO > F )(F   wIh)ghI (F )dF;
U lI(F ) =
Z
Pr(FO > F )(F   wl)glI(F )dF;
where Pr(FO > F ) is the probability of winning the bidding and F   wIr reects the prot above
the expected audit cost.
The equilibrium bidding strategies. We solve the previous maximization programs by
applying the general result from the rst-price bidding equilibrium with asymmetrically informed
bidders in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983). The auditors' equilibrium bidding strategies under
asymmetric information are characterized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (i) No equilibrium exists in pure strategies; (ii) the uninformed entrant-auditor ran-
domizes her bid according to:
GO(F ) =
8><>:
0 where 0 < F < w
F  w
F wl where w  F < wh
1 where wh  F <1
;
(iii) when the control risk is low, r = l, the informed incumbent auditor randomizes his bid according
to
GlI(F ) =
8><>:
0 where 0 < F < wh + (1  )wl
F  w
(1 )(F wl) where w  F < wh
1 where wh  F <1
;
(iv) when the control risk is high, r = h, the informed incumbent auditor bids F = wh all the time;
i.e.,
GhI (F ) =
(
0 where 0 < F < wh
1 where wh  F <1
:
The bidding range [ w;wh] deserves some discussion, which we provide in more detail in the proof
of Lemma 1. Both the incumbent and entrant auditors must bid over the same range in order for
the mixed-strategy equilibrium to hold. The lower bound w is the entrant auditor's expected audit
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fee to break even without any private information about the rm's control risk. The entrant will
not bid below w, because otherwise he will suer an expected loss, upon winning with a positive
probability. The upper bound wh represents the expected total audit costs for the entrant auditor
when the control risk is high. It is the entrant's maximum bid for two reasons: (1) if the upper
bound falls below wh, with a strictly positive probability, the entrant may win for the high-control-
risk rm and suer a loss, because the fee does not cover her expected audit cost; and (2) if the
upper bound exceeds wh, the incumbent observing a high control risk can always bid strictly below
wh and win the bidding, earning strictly positive prots with a positive probability. Therefore the
incumbent has an incentive to deviate by bidding over a range with a lower upper bound. Together,
the upper bound of the bidding range shall be exactly wh.
Following Engelbrecht-Wiggans, et al. (1983), in such bidding no pure strategy exists, because
any pure-strategy bidding puts the entrant auditor at a loss in expectation.21 This is because if an
entrant auditor were to adopt a pure strategy that could be predicted, the incumbent auditor would
always bid a slightly lower audit fee when the control risk is low, and not bid when the control risk
is high. The entrant auditor would then win the audit engagement only when the control risk is
high, resulting in a winner's curse.
In equilibrium, the entrant, without any information about the client rm, bids according to
the mixed strategy GO(F ) stated in Lemma 1 to break even on average, UO(F ) = 0. Otherwise,
the outside auditor will not participate in the bidding. Notice that to avoid the winner's curse,
the outside auditor always bids the upper bound wh with a strictly positive probability density,
gO(wh) = (wh   w)=(wh   wl). In contrast, the incumbent auditor earns a strictly positive prot
(information rent) due to his information advantage. When the control risk is high, the incumbent
auditor always bids the upper bound wh, which gives him a constant prot upon winning|U
h
I (F ) =
wh   wIh.22 When the control risk is low, the incumbent auditor plays a mixed bidding strategy
over the bidding range [ w;wh] and also earns a constant prot, U
l
I(F ) = w   wl = (wh   wl) as
21See the Appendix proof for a detail argument of the non-existence of pure-strategy bidding.
22In fact, when the control risk is high, perverse equilibria exist for the incumbent to bid in the upper bound range
[wIh; wh]. We can use the trembling-hand renement and nd the equilibrium where the incumbent bids wh when the
control risk is high. The argument is provided in the proof.
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shown in the proof.
4.2 Audit Fees and Audit Switching
The expected audit fees. From the rm's perspective, we calculate the ex-ante expected audit
fees from an incumbent auditor's engagement vs. an entrant auditor's engagement. We assume
that if the incumbent and the outside auditors bid the same price, the incumbent auditor wins
the engagement.23 The expected audit fee when the incumbent auditor wins the engagement is
E[FI ] = E[F
h
I ]+(1 )E[F lI ], where E[F hI ] and E[F lI ] are the expected audit fee of the incumbent
auditor winning high- and low-risk rms as below
E[F rI ] =
Z wh
w
(1 GO(F ))FgrI(F )dF;
respectively. Substituting the equilibrium bidding strategies, GO(F )) and g
r
I , in Lemma 1, we
obtain that E[F hI ] = wh and E[F
l
I ] = wh +
1
2(1  )wl. Thus, in equilibrium, given the optimal
audit eort levels qh and ql chosen by an entrant auditor, we have
E[F I ] = wh +
1
2
(1  )2wl: (5)
Similarly, we calculate the ex-ante expected audit fee from an entrant auditor's engagement.
E[FO] =
Z wh
w
[(1 GhI (F ))F + (1  )(1 GhI (F ))]gO(F )dF:
Substituting the equilibrium bidding strategies in Lemma 1 and the optimal audit eort levels qh
and ql, we have
E[F O] = (1  )wh +
1
2
(1  )2wl (6)
From the rm's perspective, the expected audit fee for the incumbent auditor E[F I ] is higher
than that for the entrant auditor E[F O]. The incumbent auditor's fee premium is driven by the
incumbent auditor winning the bid when the rm's control risk is high and charging the highest
23This is a reasonable assumption, because the rm may need to incur a switching cost that we do not model (see
DeAngelo 1981; Kanodia and Mukherji 1994) or the incumbent auditor may provide a higher quality audit due to
the knowledge advantage..
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fee wh, that is, E[F

I ]  E[F O]  E[F hI ] = 2wh. The probability that the incumbent wins in the
high-risk rm is exactly , because the entrant auditor bids with a mass of  (which is her best
guess about the rm risk being high, based on the prior distribution) at the upper bound in order
to protect herself from the winner's curse. Thus, if the probability of high control risk  increases,
the incumbent auditor is more likely to obtain this premium. It is also interesting to note that
the overall ex-ante expected fee from the entrant auditor, E[FO], is the same as the incumbent
auditor's expected fee when winning the engagement in the low-risk rm, (1 )E[F lI ]. Because of
information advantage, the incumbent auditor earns informational rent in the low-risk rm, while
the entrant auditor simply breaks even across rms with dierent control risks.
Proposition 1 The expected audit fee for the incumbent auditor is always higher than that for the
entrant auditor E[F I ] > E[F

O]. The dierence in the expected audit fee increases in the probability
of high control risk  and the entrant's expected audit cost in the high-risk rm wh.
Ex-ante, the total expected audit fee for the rm is given by
F t = E[F

O] + E[F

I ] = w + (1  )(wh   wl): (7)
We simply add the expected audit fees from the incumbent and entrant auditors together, because
E[F I ] and E[F

O] already take into account the endogenous outcome of the bidding game (i.e., the
probability of switching) in calculating the fee from one auditor. We will subsequently compare
the expected audit fees under the mandatory rotation and audit retendering regimes, and explain
in more detail about the incumbent auditor's information rent.
The probability of audit switching. Under an audit retendering regime, the rm switches
its auditor only when receiving an external bid lower than the incumbent auditor. Denote by
fh; lg the probability of switching to the entrant auditor when the control risk is high and low,
respectively. When the control risk is high, the incumbent always bids the maximum audit fee wh.
As such, the entrant auditor wins the audit engagement when her bid is below wh, which leads to
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a total probability of switching,
h = GO(wh) = 1  :
When the control risk is low, however, both the incumbent and the entrant auditors play mixed
strategies fGO(F ), GlI(F )g over the bidding range. In this case, the probability that the entrant
auditor wins the audit engagement becomes
l =
Z wh
w
GO(F )g
l
IdF = (1  )=2:
In equilibrium, the entrant auditor is more likely to win the audit engagement when the control
risk is high rather than low (h > l). This result is known as the \winner's curse" in the literature
(Milgrom and Webber 1982). Ex ante, without observing the control risk, the client rm expects
to switch to the entrant auditor with the probability of
  h + (1  )l =
1  2
2
: (8)
Proposition 2 Under audit retendering, the client rm with high control risk is more likely to
switch to the entrant auditor ex post than the rm with low control risk, i.e., h > l. The ex-ante
overall likelihood of switching decreases when the probability of high control risk increases (a higher
), i.e., dd < 0.
4.3 The Investors' Problem and Firm Payo
We now solve the investors' problem on Date 3. Before providing capital K to the rm, investors
observe the following: (1) whether an auditor switch has occurred, and (2) the issued auditor's
report. Following the information structure assumption in (1), investors provide capital if and only
if a good report is observed. Corollary 2 suggests that under the audit retendering regime, the
auditor that wins the engagement contains information about the unobservable control risk. While
investors cannot observe the client rm's true control risk and audit quality, they know that the
entrant auditor is more likely to win the audit engagement when the control risk is high. That is,
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the auditor switch itself conveys information to investors.
Investors take into account both the auditor's report and the auditor switch when updating
their belief about the project state, and request a fraction a of the project return to break even
in providing the capital investment K, where a 2 fO; Ig indicates the report issued by an outside
auditor or an incumbent auditor. The investors' expected payo is given by
V (a;K) = a Pr(Gjg; a)R K; for a 2 fO; Ig:
In the competitive market, investors are expected to break even from the investment, V (a;K) = 0.
Thus, in equilibrium, investors request a fraction a,
a =
K
Pr(Gjg; a)R: (9)
The investors' fraction decreases with the investors' updated belief about the project's state
being good upon observing the auditor's good report, which we call the informativeness of the
auditor's report. Under auditor retendering, the investors' updated belief depends on the identity
of the auditor who issues the good report, Pr(Gjg;O) and Pr(Gjg; I). Specically, investors take
into account the probabilities of switching to an outside auditor, h and l, for the high- and
low-control-risk rm when updating their belief. Therefore, we have
Pr(Gjg;O) = p
p+ (1  p)[h(1  qh) + (1  )l(1  ql)]
(10)
and Pr(Gjg; I) = (1  )p
(1  )p+ (1  p)[(1  h)(1  qIh) + (1  )(1  l)(1  ql)]
; (11)
where   g + (1  )b is the overall expected probability of switching. If the entrant auditor
wins the audit engagement, investors conjecture that the audit eort level will be qh and ql in the
high- and low-risk rms respectively. However, if the incumbent auditor wins the audit engagement,
the investors' conjecture of the audit eort level in the high-control-risk rm is qIh, which is larger
than the eort provided by an entrant auditor qh.
The informativeness of the auditor's good report issued by the entrant and incumbent auditors,
Pr(Gjg;O) and Pr(Gjg; I), are dierent due to two factors: (1) the auditor switch occurs more
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often in the high-control-risk rm, i.e., h > l. This suggests that when the entrant (incumbent)
auditor issues the good report, investors assign a greater (less) weight to the high-control-risk rm,
which is subject to a greater type-II error; and (2) the incumbent auditor's audit quality is higher
than the outside auditor in the high-control-risk rm. Combining the eects from these two factors,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under an audit retendering regime, the entrant auditor's report is less informative
about the good project state than the incumbent auditor's, i.e., Pr(Gjg;O) < Pr(Gjg; I). Investors
request a higher fraction of the project return when the audit report is issued by the entrant auditor
than when it is issued by the incumbent, O > 

I .
Notice that even if the incumbent auditor does not have any knowledge advantage over the
entrant auditor (i.e., qIh = qh), the information asymmetry in the bidding alone leads to dierent
informativeness levels of auditors' reports that determine investors' equilibrium fraction of return.
We then calculate the rm's expected payo under audit retendering. The rm receives its share
in the project return only when the project is funded and the good state is realized. Moreover, the
auditor's report may be either from the incumbent or the entrant auditor. Taking into account the
overall probability of an auditor switch,  in (8), the rm's expected payo under audit retendering
is given by
Wt(

a; F

t ) = pR[1  (O + (1  )I)]  F t : (12)
Substituting a from (9) and F t from (7) into the rm's payo function above, we obtain
Wt(

a; F

t ) = p(R K)  (1  p)Kf[h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh)] + (1  )(1  ql)g
  w   (1  )(wh   wl):
The rm's expected payo is the expected project payo in the good state, subtracting the invest-
ment loss due to the type-II error in the auditor's report and minus the expected audit fee. The
investment loss depends on the average audit quality from the auditors, taking into account that
the auditor may switch in the audit retendering regime. When the incumbent auditor remains
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engaged in auditing the high-control-risk rm, which occurs with a probability of 1 h, the audit
quality is qIh, higher than that of the entrant auditor. The audit switch in the low-control-risk
rm does not aect the investment loss, however, because for the low-risk rm, the incumbent and
entrant auditors' cost are the same, which leads to the same level of audit quality.
4.4 Empirical implications
Our analysis under an audit retendering regime oers testable empirical implications for client-
initiated auditor changes and explains some empirical ndings in the literature. Audit tenders
are not uncommon in practice. Client rms can always voluntarily tender their audit services,
which may result in an auditor switch. Beattie and Fearnley (1998) found that about 55% of
auditor changes in U.K. companies were caused by an audit tender. However, rms typically do
not disclose in detail the tender process that leads to such switch, making it hard to identify an
auditor switch driven by a optimal tender process or by an opportunistic incentive, such as opinion
shopping. Even if a client rm might have gone through a tender process, the incumbent auditor
still wins the bid and remains engaged. Thus it is empirically hard to test the outcome of the
auditor tender directly, as predicted by our model. With the caveat of the unobservability of the
tender process, we next discuss how our theoretical results can shed light on the determinants and
consequences of an auditor switch on average.
Prior empirical studies have documented the audit fee discounts when rms switch auditors
(Simon and Francis, 1988; Deis and Girous, 1996), which is consistent with our model's prediction.
As shown in our model, this fee discount is not driven by the entrant auditor's low-balling incentive,
but is primarily due to the information disadvantage of the entrant auditor. Deis and Girous (1996)
also found that new auditors spend longer audit hours after the switch, consistent with our model, in
which high-control-risk rms are more likely to switch, leading to higher costs for entrant auditors.
Our result in Corollary 1 predicts that for these switchers, the fee discount is larger when the
rm's control risk is higher or if the audit procedure is more complex or costly, which can be tested
cross-sectionally.
We also provide theoretical explanations for empirical ndings on the consequences of auditor
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switches. Our result that an auditor switch itself conveys information to the market regarding
the underlying client risk is consistent with the negative market reaction to auditor switching in
Weiss and Kalbers (2008). Furthermore, Kim and Park (2006) found that rms switching auditors
underprice to a greater degree in their seasoned equity oerings. This result is consistent with
Corollary 3, in that that the entrant auditor's report is less informative to investors, thereby leading
to more underpricing. Our model also oers a cautionary note in drawing policy implications on
mandatory auditor rotation based on the empirical ndings from auditor switches under the current
regime, because the voluntary auditor switch reveals additional rm information to the market;
while auditor switches under mandatory auditor rotation do not have such information content.
5 Mandatory Auditor Rotation
In this section, we consider the mandatory auditor rotation regime in which the client rm is
required to hire a new auditor from the audit market at the beginning of the period. Only an
external auditor can engage in the audit service under mandatory auditor rotation, and there is no
competitive bidding between the external and incumbent auditors.
The timeline of events is as follows. The rm hires an auditor and pays an audit fee of Fm;
which allows the auditor to break even in expectation. After engagement, the auditor privately
observes the control risk and exerts audit eort q to issue an audit report. If the audit report is
b, the project is not funded and the game ends. If the audit report is g, the project is funded by
selling m share of the rm to investors. If the project is funded, the cash ow is realized later.
In case of success, investors receive an m portion of the cash ow R. In case of failure, investors
receive zero.
The auditor's problem. After the audit engagement, the auditor perfectly observes the
control risk of the client rm and chooses eort q to maximize the expected payo, Ur(q; Fm),
which is dened as
Ur(q; Fm) = Fm   w(q; cr); (13)
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where Fm is the audit fee, and w(q; cr) is the expected total audit cost for the client rm with
control risk r, r 2 fl; hg.
The total audit cost is the cost of audit eort plus the expected litigation cost. The cost of
eort depends on the control risk. Because the engaging auditor is always an external auditor who
does not have private information about the control risk, the marginal cost of audit is always cr.
A litigation cost is only incurred when a type-II error exists. Therefore, the expected total audit
cost is
w(q; cr) = (1  q)(1  p)L+ cr (q): (14)
Thus, the auditor chooses the optimal eort by solving the following problem:
qr 2 argmax
q
Ur(q; Fm) = Fm   w(q; cr): (15)
Substituting  (q) = q2=2 and w(q; cr) into (15), and solving the rst-order condition for q, we
obtain
qr =
(1  p)L
cr
: (16)
To ensure that the audit eort qr in equilibrium is less than one (qr < 1), we assume that the legal
cost L is not too large; that is, L < cr=(1   p): Clearly, audit fee Fm has no direct impact on the
audit eort qr, because Fm is determined before the engagement. The auditor essentially chooses
the eort level to minimize the expected total cost, taking the audit fee as exogenous.
Corollary 1 Under a mandatory rotation regime, the auditor exerts higher eort for the low-risk
rm than the high-risk rm, i.e., qh < ql. Holding the control risk constant, the audit eort qr
increases in the legal cost L.
The audit fee. In a competitive audit market, the auditor expects to break even from the
audit engagement. Given optimal eort levels qh and ql in (16), the auditor's ex-ante expected
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payo prior to observing the control risk is
E[U(Fm; qh; ql)] = Fm   [wh + (1  )wl]; (17)
where wh = (1   qh)(1   p)L + ch (qh), wl = (1   ql)(1   p)L + cl (ql), and qr is given in (16).
Thus, the rm oers the audit fee F m that satises the auditor's break-even condition. Setting
E[U(Fm; qh; ql)] = 0, we obtain
F m = wh + (1  )wl  w: (18)
As shown above, the audit fee covers the ex-ante expected total cost of the audit engagement, which
we denote as w.
Corollary 2 The audit fee F m increases with the legal cost L (@F m=@L > 0), the probability of
high control risk  (@F m=@ > 0), and the marginal cost of audit eort cr (@F m=@cr > 0).
The investors' problem. Investors cannot directly observe the true project state fG;Bg,
and rely on the audit report to update their belief. Following the assumption in (1), a bad audit
report perfectly reveals the bad state|Pr(Bjb) = 1|in which case the investors always receive
zero payo. Hence investors provide capital to the rm if and only if the audit report is g. Given
a good audit report g and the equilibrium audit eort qh and ql, the investors' posterior belief in
the project's good state Pr(Gjg) is
Pr(Gjg) = p
p+ (1  p)[(1  qh) + (1  )(1  ql)] : (19)
Thus, investors require a fraction m of the project return for providing capital investment K,
which gives the expected payo as
V (m;K) = m Pr(Gjg)R K:
In a competitive market, investors earn normalized zero-expected returns from the investment.
26
Thus, by setting the investor's payo V (m;K) to zero, we obtain the equilibrium fraction 

m,
m =
K
Pr(Gjg)R: (20)
Intuitively, the investors' share of the project return decreases with the posterior belief Pr(Gjg),
which indicates the informativeness of the audit report. The higher the audit eort, the more
informative the auditor's report. Thus, investors request a lower fraction of the project if the
equilibrium audit eort is higher. Following Remark 1, we obtain the following results regarding
the investors' equilibrium share.
Corollary 3 Investors request a higher fraction m when the legal cost L is lower (@m=@L < 0),
the probability of high control risk is higher (@m=@ > 0), or when the marginal cost of audit eort
is higher (@m=@cr > 0):
The rm's problem. The rm receives the remaining 1   m fraction of the project's cash
ows when the project is funded and the good state is realized. The rm's overall expected payo,
denoted as W (m; Fm), is thus characterized by
W (m; Fm) = p(1  m)R  Fm:
The rm's expected payo is the expected return on the project minus the audit fee. If investors
request a fraction of m in the project's cash ows upon a good signal, the rm's expected return
on the project then becomes p(1   m)R, because the good state always generates a good signal
(P (gjG) = 1). As previously discussed, given the competitive audit market and capital market,
both the auditor and investors earn zero expected return in equilibrium, which determines m and
F m as stated in (20) and (18) respectively. It is clear that the rm's expected payo decreases with
m and F m. Corollaries 2 and 3 imply that when the probability of high control risk  increases,
or when the marginal cost of audit eort cr increases, the expected rm payo always decreases
because of both a higher audit fee and a larger investor share. However, when the auditor's litigation
cost increases, it leads to a higher equilibrium audit fee (Corollary 2), but a lower investors' share
(Corollary 3). This is because a higher litigation cost induces a higher audit eort (see Eq.16),
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which reduces the type-II error so that investors request a lower share in return. For the auditor,
however, the total expected audit cost is actually higher in equilibrium, because the litigation cost
also has a direct eect on the audit cost.
We substitute m and F m into the rm's payo function, and obtain that
W (m; F

m) = p(R K)  (1  p)[(1  qh) + (1  )(1  ql)]K   w; (21)
where w follows (18). The rm's expected payo has three components: the rst term represents
the project return in the good state, the second term is the investment loss due to an audit failure
(i.e., a type-II error) and the third term is the expected total audit costs. In equilibrium, the rm
bears the investment loss and the total audit cost, both of which depend on the equilibrium audit
eort as stated in (16).
6 Comparison between Audit Retendering and Auditor Rotation
6.1 Comparison of the Expected Audit Fee
To facilitate comparisons between two regimes, we juxtapose the expected audit fees in the following
table. Under the auditor rotation regime, the audit fee is always equal to the expected audit cost in
order for the auditor to break even, E[F m] = w from (18). Under audit retendering, the expected
audit fee is given by (7), E[F t ] = w + (1  )(wh   wl).
It is easy to see that the client rm's expected audit fee under audit retendering is always
higher than that under mandatory auditor rotation. To see this, recall that under the audit
retendering regime, both the entrant auditor and the incumbent auditor (in the low-risk rm)
adopt a randomized bidding strategy in the range [ w;wh], where the lower bound of the bidding
range is exactly the same as the expected audit fee under the mandatory rotation regime. When
the control risk is high, the incumbent auditor always bids wh, also strictly higher than w. Thus, it
is intuitive that the expected audit fee from the bidding outcome always exceeds the lower bound
w, which is the expected audit fee under the mandatory rotation regime.
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Regime Audit fees F Comparison
Rotation: E[F m] = w = wh + (1  )wl Benchmark
Retendering: E[F t ] = w + (1  )(wh   wl) Higher
Proposition 4 The expected audit fee under audit retendering is always higher than that under
mandatory auditor rotation.
The dierence between audit fees in the two regimes is
F  E[F t ]  E[F m] = (1  )(wh   wl): (22)
The rm's total expected audit fee in the audit retendering regime consists of two parts: the break-
even audit fee w,which is the expected audit cost from the entrant auditor's perspective, and the
incumbent auditor's expected prot in the low-control-risk rm, (1   )(wh   wl). As discussed
in the bidding game of Section 5.1, the incumbent auditor earns a strictly positive constant prot
of U lI(F ) = (wh   wl) when the control risk is low. Therefore, overall, the incumbent auditor
earns an expected prot of (1  )U lI(F ) = (1  )(wh  wl) in the low-control-risk rm, which is
exactly the fee dierence in (22). Even though the incumbent auditor also earns a strictly positive
prot in the high-risk rm, this does not add an incremental fee from the rm's perspective when
compared to the mandatory rotation regime. The incumbent's prot in the high-control-risk rm
is due to its knowledge advantage in auditing the high-control-risk rm. However, this part of
the cost eciency does not lower the audit fee, since the incumbent auditor always bids as if he
incurs the same cost as the entrant. As a result, the audit fee dierence under these two regimes
is driven exclusively by the incumbent auditor's information rent in the low-control-risk rm. The
fee dierence is purely driven by the information advantage of the incumbent auditor; that is, the
dierence still exists even if the incumbent auditor does not gain any knowledge advantage over
the entrant auditor from his prior engagement with the rm.
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6.2 Comparison of the Audit Report Informativeness
We next analyze the informativeness of the audit report under the two regimes. Under the manda-
tory rotation regime, the auditor report informativeness is Pr(Gjg) from (19), while under the audit
retendering regime, the audit report informativeness is either Pr(Gjg;O) from (10) or Pr(Gjg; I)
and (11), depending on the auditor who issues the report. In Proposition 3, we have already shown
that under the audit retendering regime, the audit report issued by the incumbent auditor is more
informative than that of the entrant auditor. We now compare the informativeness of each type of
auditor's report under audit retendering with that of the report under mandatory rotation.
We rst compare the informativeness of the entrant auditor's report Pr(Gjg;O) under audit
retendering with the report under mandatory rotation Pr(Gjg). In both cases, the auditor's eorts
for high- and low-control-risk rms are both qh and ql respectively, because both reports are issued
by the entrant auditor who has no prior engagement with the rm. However, the informativeness
of these two reports remains dierent due to the information conveyed by the audit switch under
the audit retendering regime. To see this, rewrite Pr(Gjg;O) in (10) as
Pr(Gjg;O) = p
p+ (1  p)[h (1  qh) + (1  )l (1  ql)]
; (23)
where h and l are the probabilities of an audit switch in the high- and low-control-risk rms
respectively, and  = h + (1   )l is the overall expected probability of the switch. Under
the audit retendering regime, when investors observe the audit report by the entrant auditor, they
update their prior belief about the auditor's type-II error with the weights on the high- and low-risk
rm as h and
l
 , respectively. Because an audit switch for the high-risk rm is more likely than the
low-risk rm, h >  > l, investors assign greater weight to the high-risk rm, which has a lower
audit quality than the low-risk rm. Therefore, the audit report from the entrant auditor under
mandatory rotation is less informative than the one under audit retendering, Pr(Gjg;O) < Pr(Gjg).
We next compare the informativeness of the incumbent auditor's report Pr(Gjg; I) with the
report under mandatory rotation Pr(Gjg). The dierence in the informativeness of these two
reports is driven not only by the additional information conveyed through audit retention, but also
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by the incumbent auditor's ability to conduct a higher audit quality in the high-risk rm. When the
audit switch does not occur under audit retendering, the investors believe that the rm's control
risk is more likely to be low; thus they update their prior belief by assigning greater weight to the
low-risk rm, which has a higher audit quality than the high-risk rm. As such, we can rewrite
Pr(Gjg; I) in (11) as
Pr(Gjg; I) = p
p+ (1  p)[1 h1  (1  qIh) + (1  )1 l1  (1  ql)]
; (24)
and the weights on the high- and low-risk rms are (1  h)=(1  ) < 1 and (1  l)=(1  ) > 1
respectively. Hence, the audit report by the incumbent auditor is more informative. In addition,
because the incumbent auditor has a lower marginal cost in conducting the audit in the high-risk
rm, the audit quality is higher than that of an entrant auditor with no prior engagement, qIh > qh.
This also further increases the informativeness of the audit report from the incumbent under the
audit retendering regime. Thus, combining these two factors, we have Pr(Gjg; I) > Pr(Gjg).
Notice that the above mentioned comparison results, Pr(Gjg;O) < Pr(Gjg) < Pr(Gjg; I), still
hold even if the incumbent auditor does not have any knowledge advantage over the entrant auditor.
That is, the audit switch through audit tendering with asymmetric information provides additional
information to the investors.
On average, the expected informativeness of an auditor's report (before the switch) under au-
dit retendering, denoted by E[Pr(Gjg)], is always higher than that under mandatory rotation,
i.e., E[Pr(Gjg)] > Pr(Gjg). This dierence, however, is purely driven by the incumbent auditor's
knowledge advantage, which allows him to deliver a higher audit quality after winning the au-
dit engagement in the high-risk rm. By contrast, under mandatory rotation, such a knowledge
advantage is not retained and the audit quality is always the same across dierent periods.
Regime The informativeness of the audit report Comparison
Rotation: Pr(Gjg) Benchmark
Retendering: Entrant Pr(Gjg;O) Lower
Retendering: Incumbent Pr(Gjg; I) Higher
Retendering: Ex-ante E[Pr(Gjg)] Higher
As the audit report becomes more informative, investors request a lower fraction of the project
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return. It thus follows directly that under mandatory auditor rotation, investors request a higher
(lower) fraction than when the audit report is issued by the incumbent (entrant) auditor under the
audit retendering regime (O > 

m > 

I). We summarize the results in the following table.
Regime Required Fraction  Comparison
Rotation:  = KPr(Gjg)R Benchmark
Retendering: Entrant O =
K
Pr(Gjg;O)R Higher
Retendering: Incumbent I =
K
Pr(Gjg;I)R Lower
Proposition 5 In the presence of information asymmetry,
 the informativeness of the audit report under mandatory auditor rotation is lower (higher)
than the incumbent (entrant) auditor's report under audit retendering (i.e., Pr(Gjg;O) <
Pr(Gjg) < Pr(Gjg; I));
 the expected informativeness of the audit report under audit retendering is always higher than
under mandatory rotation (E[Pr(Gjg)] > Pr(Gjg));
 the investors' requested fraction under mandatory auditor rotation is higher (lower) than
when the audit report is issued by the incumbent (entrant) auditor under audit retendering
(O > 

m > 

I).
6.3 Comparison of the Firm's Expected Payo
We compare the client rm's expected payo under two regimes in this section. The rm's expected
payo depends on the investment loss due to the auditor's type-II error and the audit fee paid.
Specically, under the mandatory rotation regime, the client rm's expected payo isW m as stated
in (21); under the audit retendering regime, the rm's expected payo is W t stated in(12). Denote
by W the dierence of the client rm's expected payo between two regimes, and we have
W  Wt(I ; OF t ) Wm(m; F m)
= (1  p)f[h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh)]  (1  qh)gK   (F t   F m)
= (1  p)(1  h)(qIh   qh)K   (1  )(wh   wl): (25)
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In (25), the rst term represents the dierence in the investment loss due to the auditor's
type-II error, and the second term represents the dierence in audit fee, which is the incumbent
auditor's information rent under the audit retendering regime. On the one hand, the expected
audit fee is higher under the audit retendering regime than under mandatory auditor rotation,
because the incumbent auditor earns information rent under audit retendering. On the other
hand, the expected investment loss due to a type-II error is smaller under audit retendering than
under mandatory rotation, because the incumbent auditor accumulates rm-specic knowledge or
expertise that reduces the cost of auditing, which in turn improves the audit quality and reduces
the type-II error. In equilibrium, the comparison of the two regimes depends the economic trade-o
between information rent and audit eciency.
Substituting the equilibrium fwh; wl; h; qIh; qhg into (25), we obtain
W = L(1  p)2

K(ch   cIh)
chc
I
h
  (1  )L(ch   cl)
2chcl

:
We can thus derive the following comparative statics results about the rm's expected payo. First,
when the client rm's control risk is more homogeneous (i.e., ch is closer to cl), the incumbent's
private information is less valuable, resulting in a lower information rent. Second, when the incum-
bent auditor's knowledge advantage is larger (i.e., a smaller cIh), the client rm is better o with
audit retendering, because the reduction in investment loss is expected to be larger. Third, when
the required investment K is larger, audit retendering results in a higher rm payo, because the
investment loss due to the entrant auditor's low audit quality under mandatory rotation is more
severe. When the control risk is more likely to be high (a high ), the incumbent's information
rent is smaller, suggesting that the client rm is more likely to benet from audit retendering.
Proposition 6 The client rm's payo under audit retendering is larger than under mandatory
auditor rotation when
 the client rm's control risk is more homogeneous (i.e., ch   cl is small); or
 the incumbent auditor's knowledge advantage is higher (i.e., a smaller cIh); or
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 the required investment K is larger; or
 the control risk is more likely to be high (a higher ).
Lastly, the eect of the legal cost L on the rm's expected payo is unclear. On the audit
eciency side, higher legal costs lead to a larger dierence in audit quality due to the incumbent
auditor's knowledge advantage, which reduces the investment loss even more. On the information
rent side, higher legal costs also directly increase the audit fee, which increases the incumbent's
information rent relative to the fee under mandatory rotation. We identify a threshold for the
required investment K, such that for K > K, the client rm is more likely to benet from audit
retendering when the legal cost is higher (@W=@L > 0).
Corollary 4 There exists a threshold K such that for K > K, the client rm's payo under
audit retendering is larger than under mandatory auditor rotation, when the legal cost L is higher
(@W=@L > 0):
6.4 Regulatory Implications
We have compared the rm's expected payo under two audit regulations: auditor rotation and
audit retendering. As Proposition 6 shows, client rms are not necessarily better o with either
regulation. We next analyze the economic trade-os between the two regulations from a regulator's
perspective. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that the regulator's objective is to maximize the
social welfare, which is a weight average of the players' expected payos, including the client rm,
the investor, the incumbent auditor, and the entrant auditor. Denote by WR the regulator's payo
with a weight  2 [0; 1] on the rm's payo. Under mandatory auditor rotation, both the auditor
and investors break even in equilibrium. Thus, the regulator's payo equals the proportion  of
the rm's expected payo (WmR = Wm(

m; F

m)). By contrast, under audit retendering, while
both the entrant auditor and investors break even (i.e., E[UO(F )] = 0), the incumbent auditor
expects to earn a positive payo due to information advantage. The regulator's expected payo is
given by W rR = Wr(

r ; F

r )+ (1  )UI(F ): The dierence of the regulator's payo under the two
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regulations is
WR = W
r
R  WmR = Wr(r ; F r ) + (1  )UI(F )  Wm(m; F m);
=  [Wr(

r ; F

r ) Wm(m; F m)] + (1  )UI(F );
= W + (1  )UI(F );
= (1  p)(1  h)(qIh   qh)I + (1  2)(1  )(wh   wl);
where the rst term relates to the client rm's investment loss, and the second term relates to
the incumbent auditor's information rent. When the regulator is equally concerned about the
client rm's and the auditor's payo (i.e.,  = 1=2), the regulator is strictly better o with audit
retendering (WR > 0). However, if the regulator places slightly greater weight on the client rm's
payo ( > 1=2), audit retendering does not always lead to a higher payo to the regulator, and
the results of Proposition 6 hold from the regulator's perspective as well. That is, given  > 1=2,
the regulator would prefer auditor retendering when the auditor's information rent is small or when
the incumbent auditor's higher audit quality is more important to reduce the investment loss.
7 Discussions
7.1 Auditor Independence
We focus on the economic trade-o between information rent and audit eciency under two regimes,
and do not explicitly incorporate auditor independence issues. Conventional wisdom holds that
auditor independence is more likely to be maintained under a mandatory auditor rotation regime,
because a long-term engagement might lead auditors to become more aligned with the client and lose
their independence. Thus, it is essential for us to provide some discussion regarding the implications
of auditor independence in our model. We argue that in our model, auditor independence is
not necessarily more likely to be compromised under audit retendering than under mandatory
auditor rotation. We support this argument from two perspectives through informal discussions of
incorporating auditor independence in our model.
In our model, the incumbent auditor earns positive information rent (value of incumbency).
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One may think that the threat of losing future information rent could make the incumbent auditor
more likely to compromise an auditor report. However, information rent here is very dierent from
the quasi-rent driven by switching costs, as discussed in DeAngelo (1981). First, unlike switching
costs, information rent is inevitable, as long as the incumbent auditor has an information advantage
and is allowed to participate in audit tenders. Second, the client rm cannot verify whether the
auditor earns information rent or not ex-post, because the incumbent auditor's private information
regarding the client-specic risk is not veriable and never revealed. The rm, without observing
the control risk, accepts the lowest bid from the auditors and switches only when an outside auditor
bids a lower price than the incumbent. The client rm thus cannot obtain a favorable auditor report
by credibly threatening the termination of the incumbent auditor. In other words, the information
rent earned by the incumbent auditor does not necessarily decrease auditor independence.
Alternatively, we can address the independence issue from an ex-post perspective. We argue
that it is more costly for the client rm to induce the auditor to compromise her independence
under audit retendering than under mandatory auditor rotation. In our model, when the audit
evidence is bad, the auditor knows that additional legal costs will result later if she misreports it
as good. To compromise an audit report, the client rm needs to compensate the additional audit
liability borne by the auditor, as in Deng et al (2014). However, the legal cost for compromising the
audit report is dierent between the incumbent and the entrant auditors. Because of his knowledge
advantage, the incumbent auditor delivers a higher quality audit service and is more likely to detect
a bad state when the client rm's control risk is high. This suggests that the incumbent auditor's
expected legal costs are higher if he compromises his independence. In other words, holding the
benet of compromising the audit report constant, the auditor independence is less likely to be an
issue under audit retendering.
Supporting our view, most empirical studies do not nd evidence that longer auditor tenure
always impairs auditor independence. For example, Bamber and Iyer showed that more experienced
auditors are less likely to acquiesce to the client's position and that audit rm tenure is associated
with a decreased likelihood of auditor concessions. Wang and Tuttle (2009) suggested that under
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mandatory rm rotation, negotiation results are closer to the auditor's preference than that of
the client. In the case of Spain, Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gomez-Aguilar, and Carrera (2009) found no
empirical evidence that mandatory audit rm rotation is associated with a higher likelihood of
issuing going concern opinions. Moreover, the extant literature also largely suggests that nancial
statement users do not perceive long auditor tenure as a threat to the impairment of auditor
independence. Based on a survey of bankers and nancial analysts, Shockley (1981) concluded that
auditor tenure exceeding ve years is not perceived as reducing auditor independence. Ghosh and
Moon (2005) found that longer tenure is associated with better earnings quality as perceived by
equity market investors. Chi et al. (2009) did not nd any impact of partner rotation on actual
audit quality (proxied by abnormal accruals) or perceived audit quality (proxied by the ERC) in
Taiwan. Theoretically, a recent paper by Dordzhieva (2018) also challenged this view, showing that
mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence.
7.2 Audit Tendering Process
We assume that under audit retendering, the client rm follows a simple rule by selecting the
auditor who bids the lowest audit fee. A study by U.K. Competition Commission shows a relative
eect of 13 percent fee reduction in the rst year after the tender process or switching compared
with rms that had not tendered or switched. This fee-based auction is reasonable for the following
reasons. In our model, both auditors have same audit technology, except that the incumbent has
rm-specic knowledge advantage. We assume implicitly that when soliciting bids from auditors, a
rm carefully controls other important factors, such as audit rm size and technology. For example,
a rm's audit committee or search committee for audit tender may impose certain criteria when
searching and soliciting bids from potential auditors, so that the winning auditor is qualied to
deliver the expected audit service. In addition, audit is an experience good where it is only possible
to determine its quality in retrospect. Therefore, it is dicult for the client rm to tell in advance
how a new auditor will be to work with and its service levels.24 Because the audit quality is not
24See "Statutory audit services for large companies market investigation" issued by U.K. Competition Commission,
paragraphs 5.57 and 9.217.
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contractible, it is dicult for the rm to design an auction mechanism that selects the winner based
on audit quality.25 Hence, as long as the bidding participants meet these basic qualications, a
fee-based auction is a reasonable assumption.
We can quantitatively identify conditions under which the price-based auction is guaranteed
as optimal for the rm. In our model, the incumbent auditor and entrant auditor provide exactly
the same quality of audit service in the low-control-risk rm. Thus, for low-risk rms, selecting
the winner based on a lower fee is always an optimal rule. For high-risk rms, however, when the
entrant auditor oers a lower fee than the incumbent (recall the incumbent always oers wh in
the high-risk rm), the rm knows that switching to an outside auditor also implies a lower audit
quality than using the incumbent. To justify the switch decision, the rm compares the potential
benet of a lower fee with the higher potential audit liability resulting from a type-II error by hiring
the entrant auditor. Specically, when the control risk is high, the expected audit fee dierence
between the incumbent and entrant auditors is
E[F hI jr = h]  E[FOjr = h] = wh  
Z wh
w
FgO(F )dF:
The client rm's investment loss due to the dierence in audit quality is (1  p)(qIh  qh)K: Thus,
the client rm benets from hiring an entrant auditor as long as
wh  
Z wh
w
FgO(F )dF  (1  p)(qIh   qh)K:
It follows that when the audit liability is suciently large (relative to the investment level), the
audit fee has a larger impact on the rm's expected payo and the above mentioned condition
always holds. Given this condition, a tender process based on audit fee is optimal for the rm.
Intuitively, when the rm risk is high, the incumbent auditor always bids the highest audit fee,
wh, which is greater than his own expected audit cost w
I
h, while the entrant auditor suers a loss
25Note that audit quality is typically regarded as soft information, and it is not contractible. Researchers have
identied various factors that potentially aect audit quality and have applied dierent empirical proxies for audit
quality, see DeFond and Zhang (2014). The U.K. Financial Reporting Council does not mandate how a new auditor
should be selected. Audit committees may assign dierent weights to audit fees and other factors aecting audit
quality, but the disclosure of such weights is not required.
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in the high-risk rm. This fee premium by the incumbent auditor, if too large, makes it optimal
for the rm to choose the entrant auditor over the incumbent despite the lower audit quality.
7.3 Other Issues
Low-balling. We consider the bidding competition between an informed incumbent and an un-
informed entrant. Our goal is to highlight the economic trade-os under audit retendering given
the incumbent's private information and knowledge advantage. From the rm's perspective, audit
retendering is more favorable when the incumbent's information rent is smaller. Conceptually, we
can extend the analysis to a two-period model. In the rst period, two symmetrically uninformed
auditors bid for the audit service in a client rm, and the winner becomes the incumbent auditor
in the tendering for the client rm's second period. In the rst period, because the uninformed
auditors know that they will earn information rent in the second period, they discount the audit
fee in the rst period in order to compete with each other. This is known as low-balling (DeAngelo
1981; Chan 1999; Lee and Gu 1998). If the rst-period audit market is perfectly competitive, the
second-period information rent may be fully extracted away. In this case, from the client rm's per-
spective, the negative eect of the information rent would be mitigated. This suggests that given
the possibility of low-balling, audit retendering could be more benecial. The low-balling that
arises endogenously in this setting, will not necessarily lead to compromise in audit independence,
as previously argued.
Information Acquisition. We assume that the incumbent auditor can perfectly observe the
control risk from the prior audit engagements with the client rm. An entrant auditor cannot
observe the actual control risk and knows only the distribution. One extension is to assume that
in the rst period, the engaged auditor needs to incur an information acquisition cost (or some
rm-specic investment) in order to assess the client rm's control risk and gain both information
and knowledge advantage in auditing the high-risk rm. In this case, the auditor faces a trade-o
between the cost of information acquisition and the potential benet of information rent from the
future audit engagement. It is intuitive that under mandatory auditor rotation, an incumbent
auditor has no incentive to acquire information or invest in rm-specic technology, because he
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expects to receive no information rent to cover the information acquisition cost. However, under
auditor retendering, an auditor has an incentive to make a rm-specic investment, since he may
earn information rent in later periods. This suggests that if the cost of information acquisition or
rm-specic knowledge investment is high or the client rm's control risk is very valuable, audit
retendering is more benecial than mandatory rotation.
Partially Informed Entrant Auditor. In our model, the entrant auditor only observes the
prior distribution regarding the client rm's control risk, and competes with a perfectly informed
incumbent auditor. We can easily extend our model to allow the entrant to be partially informed
with some noisy signals about the rm's control risk. For example, the entrant auditor may be able
to assess the rm's control risk by analyzing the client rm's nancial statements or through her
prior engagement with another rm in the same industry. The internal control weakness disclosure
after Sarbanes-Oxley may also be another source of noisy public information for the entrant. In
such a case, the bidding game is a bit more complicated, but the main intuition remains. The
incumbent's information rent would be reduced, as long as the public information is not perfect.
One implication is that such public information disclosure regarding the control risk could increase
the benet from audit retendering due to the decrease in information rent.
8 Concluding Remarks
We analytically model a rm's audit engagement under two regimes: auditor retendering and
mandatory auditor rotation. When comparing the two regimes, we nd that the expected audit fee
for the client rm under audit retendering is always higher than that under auditor rotation. While
the two entrants always bid the expected audit cost under auditor rotation, both the incumbent
and the entrant adopt the expected audit cost as the lower bound of their randomized bids un-
der audit retendering. More importantly, in the presence of information asymmetry, the expected
informativeness of audit reports under audit retendering is always higher than that under manda-
tory auditor rotation. Observing an auditor switch conveys additional information to investors. In
equilibrium, the client rm favors audit retendering, when the benet of audit eciency exceeds
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the cost of higher audit fees.
We focus on audit retendering, a new provision in EU audit reforms. This feature distinguishes
our paper from related studies on mandatory auditor rotation and auditor tenure. Our paper has
direct implications for policy debates. Relative to mandatory auditor rotation, audit retendering
can result in higher audit fees but more informative audit reports. This insight could be helpful
to the PCAOB as it continues to evaluate mandatory auditor rotation and alternative regulation
options in the U.S.
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Appendix I: Institution Background of Audit Tendering
This section describes the current audit tender practice in the U.S. and European countries to
provide a foundation for our model assumptions. Currently, any companies listed on the FTSE
100 and FTSE 250 indices must put their statutory audit services engagement out to tender no
less than every 10 years. After the mandate became eective in 2015, the order has evolved into
a professional standard of practice, and many companies have disclosed the details of their audit
tender processes in their nancial statements.
We summarize the audit tender process based on the nal report of the \Statutory audit services
for large companies market investigation."26 In its annual report, a company's audit committee an-
nounces their intention to commence a tender process for the appointment of an external auditor
for the next scal year. The audit committee conducts a market assessment during the scal year,
identifying qualied, independent public accounting rms. After the market assessment is com-
pleted, the audit committee invites qualied candidates to participate in a competitive bid and
submit their proposals. After reviewing the proposals, the audit committee makes a recommenda-
tion to the board of directors whether a new external auditor will be appointed in the next scal
year.
In their 2016 annual reports, a number of FTSE companies, including BHP Billiton Ltd, British
Petroleum, Carnival Corporation & PLC, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and Royal Dutch Shell PLC,
disclosed that they tender audit engagements during the year. The following is an excerpt from
GSK's 6-K led on December 13, 2016 (page 2).
GSK today announces it intends to appoint Deloitte LLP ("Deloitte") as its auditor with eect
from the accounting year ending 31 December 2018.
This follows a competitive audit tender process overseen by an Executive Steering Committee of
GSK's Audit & Risk Committee chaired by Judy Lewent, which culminated in a recommendation
that was approved by the Board.
26https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/le/364145/Audit Order.pdf.
and https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/53c85956-d712-47d2-989f-2f8e42be29/Audit-Tenders notes-on-best-
practice-Feb-2017.pdf
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The current auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC") will continue in their role and un-
dertake the audit of GSK until the year ending 31 December 2017, subject to reappointment by
shareholders at GSK's 2017 Annual General Meeting. The appointment of Deloitte will be recom-
mended to GSK's shareholders for approval at GSK's 2018 Annual General Meeting.
Judy Lewent, Chairman of GSK's Audit & Risk Committee, said: "I am pleased that having
conducted a, thorough, open, and transparent process, the Audit & Risk Committee has concluded
the audit tender. We would like to thank PwC for their signicant contribution as GSK's auditor
since the formation of GSK in 2001 and look forward to working with Deloitte in the future."
Voluntary audit tendering in the U.S follows similar practices as in the U.K. The following is
an excerpt from the 2016 Proxy Statement of the PPL Corporation (page 77).
Pursuant to the policy of the Audit Committee to solicit competitive proposals for audit services
from independent accounting rms at least once every ten years, the Audit Committee conducted a
competitive selection process during 2015 to determine the company's independent registered public
accounting rm for the audits of the consolidated nancial statements as of and for the scal
year ending December 31, 2016 of PPL and its subsidiary registrants. The Audit Committee invited
several international public accounting rms to participate in this process, including Ernst & Young
LLP, or EY. As a result of this process, on July 28, 2015, the Audit Committee approved the
appointment of Deloitte as the company's independent registered public accounting rm for the scal
year ending December 31, 2016. This action eectively dismissed EY as the company's independent
registered public accounting rm and became eective upon EY's completion of its procedures on the
nancial statements of PPL and its subsidiaries as of and for the scal year ended December 31,
2015 and the ling of the related Form 10-K, except with respect to audit and audit-related services
pertaining to the scal year ended December 31, 2015, as required by PPL.
The audit reports of EY on the consolidated nancial statements of PPL and its subsidiaries
as of and for the scal years ended December 31, 2013 and 2014 did not contain any adverse
opinion or disclaimer of opinion, nor were they qualied or modied as to uncertainty, audit scope
or accounting principles.
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Appendix II: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof proceeds with the following steps. First, we identify the bidding range as [ w;wh], where
w  wh + (1  )wl, wr  (1  qr)(1  p)L+ cr (qr) and wIh  (1  qIh)(1  p)L+ cIh (qIh): The
upper range wh represents the entrant auditor's expected total audit costs, including the expected
audit liability (1   qh)(1   p)L and the cost of audit eort ch (qh). Denote FO by the entrant
auditor's bid and fF lI ; F hI g by the incumbent auditor's bid when the control risk is low and high,
respectively. It is clear that both entrant and incumbent auditors have the same bidding ranges.
The incumbent auditor will not bid lower than w, because it will decrease the fee revenue without
increasing the probability of winning. In addition, the entrant can win the bid with certainty and
make a positive prot by bidding below w. Therefore, the lower bound is w.
Second, the upper bidding bound is in the range of [wIh; wh]; where w
I
h is the incumbent's total
audit cost and wh is the entrant's total audit cost. If the upper bound is lower than w
I
h, the
incumbent will lose money from the audit engagement when the control risk is high. If the upper
bound is higher than wh, then two auditors can undercut each other's bid by a small amount and
drive away the prot.
Third, within the biding range of the upper bound [wIh; wh], there exists a family of perverse
equilibria that we will rule out using the trembling-hand renement. If, given a high control risk,
the incumbent bids above wh by a mistake with a probability , the entrant could then have a
positive probability of winning the high-risk rm. In this scenario, the entrant would thus have an
incentive to deviate, because the expected prot from the deviation is strictly positive. Therefore,
the incumbent will not bid above wh: Moreover, the incumbent will not bid below w
I
h because he
will lose money. Therefore, the upper bound is in the range of [wIh; wh].
Fourth, within the bidding range of the upper bound [wIh; wh]; the entrant will not bid any fee
below wh with a pure strategy, because she expects to lose money with that strategy.
Lastly, when the control risk is high, the incumbent will bid F hI = wh with a pure strategy. We
prove this result by a contradiction. Suppose that the incumbent does not always bid wh and bids
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w0h in the range w
I
h  w0h < wh with a probability Pr(w0h 2 [wIh; wh)) > 0: In this case, if the entrant
bids FO 2 [w0h; wh) with a probability  and FO = wh with a probability 1  , her expected payo
is
E[UO(FO)] = (1 ) Pr(FO < F lI)(FO wl)+[ Pr(FO < F hI )(FO wh)+(1 ) Pr(FO < F hI )(FO wh))]:
Note that in the equilibrium, the incumbent's bidding strategies must be non-decreasing. That
is, when the control risk is low, the bidding for the low-control-risk F lI must be lower than that
for the high-control-risk w0h (F
l
I < w
0
h). This suggests that Pr(FO < F
l
I) in the rst term is zero,
because the entrant's bid is always higher than that of the incumbent. The second term is strictly
negative because the entrant's bid is either lower than the cost (FO < wh) or equals to the cost.
Together, the entrant will lose money by biding in the range [wIh; wh): Suppose instead that the
entrant always bids FO = wh, her expected payo is zero
E[UO(F )] = (1  ) Pr(FO < F lI)(FO   wl) + Pr(F < F hI )(FO   wh)) = 0:
Anticipating the entrant's bidding strategy, the incumbent should bid F hI = wh with a pure strat-
egy because he will win with the same probability, but earn more if he wins. This provides a
contradiction. Taken together, the bidding range therefore is [ w;wh]:
The entrant-auditor will adopt a randomized bidding strategy over the bidding range. For any
pure-strategy bid FO 2 [ w;wh) by the entrant auditor, the incumbent auditor can respond with a
strategy of bidding F lI = FO in the low-control-risk rm and F
l
I = wh in the high-control-risk rm.
Given that the tie-breaking rule is in favor of the incumbent, the entrant auditor will only win in
the high-cost rm and thus suer a loss of FO   wh. This winner's curse will drive the entrant
auditor to deviate from adopting this pure strategy in bidding. For a pure-strategy bid FO = wh by
the entrant auditor, the incumbent auditor will respond by bidding F lI = wh in the low-control-risk
rm and F hI = wh in the high-control-risk rm. The entrant auditor will then have an incentive
to deviate, because she can bid FO 2 ( w;wh), win the audit engagement all the time, and earn a
prot of FO  w. Consequently, the entrant auditor will randomize her bids over the bidding range.
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Similarly, we can show that the incumbent auditor will also randomize his bids over the bidding
range. When the control risk is high, the incumbent auditor will adopt a pure strategy, bidding
F hI = wh all the time, because he has no incentive to deviate from this strategy.
In sum, at the equilibrium, the entrant auditor randomizes her bids according to GO(F ), earning
zero expected prot E[UO(F )] = 0 for any bid FO 2 [ w;wh]. When the control risk is low, the
incumbent auditor randomizes his bids according to F lI , earning a maximum information rent
E[U lI(F )] = (wh wl) > 0 for any bid F lI 2 [ w;wh]. But when the control risk is high, the informed
incumbent auditor always bid wh, which includes the expected audit liability (1  qIh)(1  p)L and
the cost of audit eort cIh (q
I
h), earning a positive prot E[U
h
I (F )] = wh   wIh. Because the
expected prots are constant in these three cases, the bidders have no incentives to deviate from
these equilibrium bidding strategies.
Lastly, we need to verify that fGO(F ); GlI(F ); GhI (F )g are equilibrium bidding strategies. The
the uninformed auditor's expected payo is
E[UO(F )] = (1 GhI (F ))(F   wh) + (1  )(1 GlI(F ))(F   wl);
where wr  (1   qr)(1   p)L + ck (qr). By contrast, when the control risk is high, the informed
auditor's payo is
E[UhI (F ); c
I
h] = F   wIh:
When the control risk is low, the informed auditor's payo is
E[U lI(F ); cl] = (1 GO(F ))(F   wl) = ( w   wl) = (wh   wl):
Solving for fGO(F ); GlI(F ); GhI (F )g from these equations yields
GO(F ) =
F   w
F   wl ;
GlI(F ) =
F   w
(1  )(F   wl) :
It follows that gO(F ) and g
l
I(F ) represent the p.d.f of the entrant's and the incumbent's bidding
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strategy, respectively,
gO(F ) =
(wh   wl)
(F   wl)2 ;
glI(F ) =
(wh   wl)
(1  )(F   wl)2 :

Proof of Proposition 1
First, we analyze the entrant auditor's expected audit fee,
E[FO] =
Z wh
w
E[F^O]gO(F )dF;
where gO(F ) represents the p.d.f of the entrant's bidding strategy and E[F^O] is the expected value
of a winning bid for any FO 2 [ w;wh]. The expected value of the entrant auditor's winning bid is
E[F^O] = Pr(F
h
I > F )F + (1  ) Pr(F lI > F )F
= F + (1  )F

1  F   w
(1  )(F   wl)

=
F(wh   wl)
F   wl :
The p.d.f of the entrant's bidding strategy is
gO(F ) =
(wh   wl)
(F   wl)2 :
Substituting gO(F ) and E[F^O] into E[FO] yields
E[FO] =
Z wh
w
E[F^O]gO(F )dF
=
Z wh
w
F2(wh   wl)2
(F   wl)3 dF;
=  2(wh   wl)2 (2F   wl)
2(F   wl)2
wh
w
;
=
1
2
(1  )[2wh + (1  )wl]:
Second, we study the case in which the incumbent auditor privately observes a low control risk.
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In this case, the incumbent auditor's expected audit fee is
E[F lI ] =
Z wh
w
E[F^ lI ]g
l
I(F )dF;
where glI(F ) represents the p.d.f of the entrant's bidding strategy and E[F^
l
I ] is the expected value
of a winning bid for any F lI 2 [ w;wh]. The expected value of a winning bid is
E[F^ lI ] = Pr(FO > F )F =

1  F   w
F   wl

F:
When the control risk is low cl, the p.d.f of the incumbent's bidding strategy is
glI(F ) =
(wh   wl)
(1  )(F   wl)2 :
Substituting gO(F ) and E[F^
l
I ] into E[F
l
I ] yields
E[F lI ] =
Z wh
w
F
w   wl
(F   wl)wl
(wh   wl)
(1  )(F   wl)2dF
=  
2(wh   wl)2(2F   wl)
2(1  )(F   wl)2
wh
w
= wh +
1
2
(1  )wl:
Third, we examine the case in which the incumbent auditor privately observes a high control
risk. When the control risk is high, the informed incumbent auditor bids F = wh all the time.
Thus, the incumbent auditor's expected audit fee is
E[F hI ] = wh Pr(FO = wh) = wh(1 GO(wh))
= wh:
Ex ante, the incumbent's expected audit fee is now given by
E[FI ] = E[F
h
I ] + (1  )E[F lI ];
= wh +
1
2
(1  )2wl:
Finally, we now calculate the dierence in the expected audit fees between the incumbent and
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the entrant auditor as
E[F ]  E[FI ]  E[FO] = E[F hI ] = 2wh > 0:
It follows that the dierence E[F ] is increasing in wh and in : Recall that wr  (1   qr)(1  
p)L+ cr (qr). Substituting into q

r = (1  p)L=cr, we obtain
wh =
(1  p)L
2ch
[2ch   (1  p)L]:
It follows that
@wh
@ch
=
1
2
L2
c2h
(p  1)2 > 0;
suggesting that E[F ] increases in ch. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote by r the probability of switching to the entrant auditor when the control risk is r. When
the control risk is high, the probability that the entrant auditor wins the audit engagement is
h = GO(wh) = 1   : By contrast, when the control risk is low, the probability that the entrant
auditor wins the audit engagement is
l = Pr(FO < F
l
I) =
Z wh
w
Pr(FO < F ) Pr(F
l
I = F )dF
=
Z wh
w
GO(F )g
l
I(F )dF
=
Z wh
w

F   w
F   wl
(wh   wl)
(1  )(F   wl)2

dF
=
1  
2
;
which is strictly lower than h. This suggests that h > l. Ex ante, without observing the control
risk, the client rm expects to switch to the entrant auditor by the probability
  h + (1  )l =
1
2
(1  2) < 1
2
:

54
Proof of Proposition 3
Before funding the capital I to the rm, investors can observe (1) whether an audit switch has
occurred, and (2) the auditor report issued by the winning auditor. Denote by fO; Ig the fraction
of the project return when the audit report is issued by an entrant auditor and by an incumbent
auditor, respectively. The investors' expected payo is given by V (; I; s) = s Pr(Gjg; s)R I = 0;
where s 2 fO; Ig is an indicator showing that the audit report is issued by the entrant auditor
(s = O) or by the incumbent auditor (s = I). Denote by fh; lg the probability of switching to an
entrant auditor when the control risk is high and low, respectively. The investors' posterior beliefs
are given by
Pr(Gjg;O) = p[h + (1  )l]
[ph + (1  p)h(1  qh)] + (1  )[pl + (1  p)l(1  ql)]
;
and
Pr(Gjg; I) = p[(1  h) + (1  )(1  l)]
[p(1  h) + (1  p)(1  h)(1  qIh)] + (1  )[p(1  l) + (1  p)(1  l)(1  ql)]
;
where qh = (1  p)L=ch, qIh = (1  p)L=cIh and ql > qIh > qh.
First, we consider a special case in which the incumbent auditor has no advantage wIh = wh
(i.e., cIh = ch) or thus q
I
h = qh. In this case, as we showed previously, h = 1  and l = (1 )=2.
Given that, we can show that
lim
wIh!wh
Pr(Gjg; I) = p[1 + (2p  1)
2]
1 + 2   2(1  p)2qh   (1  p)(1  2)ql
lim
wIh!wh
Pr(Gjg;O) = p[1 + (2p  1)]
1 +   2(1  p)qh   (1  p)(1  )ql :
It follows that given wIh = wh, Pr(Gjg; I) > Pr(Gjg;O).
Second, we consider the case where wIh < wh, which suggests c
I
h < ch. The eects of c
I
h on the
probability of switching Pr(Gjg; I) can be characterized as follows:
dPr(Gjg; I)
dkh
=
@ Pr(Gjg; I)
@l| {z }
<0
@l
@cIh|{z}
>0
+
@ Pr(Gjg; I)
@qIh| {z }
>0
@qIh
@cIh|{z}
<0
:
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With some algebraic calculations, we can characterize that @ Pr(Gjg; I)=@I < 0 and @ Pr(Gjg; I)=@qIh >
0. Together with @l=@c
I
h > 0 and @q
I
h=@c
I
h < 0, it follows that dPr(Gjg; I)=dkh < 0. That is,
when wIh is lower, Pr(Gjg; I) is higher. Moreover, the eects of cIh on the probability of switching
Pr(Gjg; I) are given by
dPr(Gjg;O)
dkh
=
@ Pr(Gjg;O)
@l| {z }
>0
@l
@cIh|{z}
>0
+
@ Pr(Gjg;O)
@qIh| {z }
=0
@qIh
@cIh|{z}
<0
> 0:
This suggests that when wIh is lower, Pr(Gjg;O) is lower.
In sum, when the incumbent auditor has no advantage, Pr(Gjg; I) > Pr(Gjg;O). When the
incumbent auditor's knowledge advantage is higher (a lower wIh), Pr(Gjg; I) is strictly higher and
Pr(Gjg;O) is lower. Therefore, we prove that Pr(Gjg; I) is strictly higher than Pr(Gjg;O). Investors
demand a fraction s of the project return R so that they will break even for supplying capital I:
I = I=Pr(Gjg; I)R and O = I=Pr(Gjg;O)R: Because Pr(Gjg; I) > Pr(Gjg;O), it follows that
I < 

O.
Proof of Corollaries 1, 2, and 3
The auditor's optimal eort level is given by
@U
@qr
= (1  p)L  cr 0(qr) = 0:
Thus, the optimal audit eort is qr = (1  p)L=cr. It is immediate that if the legal cost L increases
or the marginal cost cr decreases, the audit eort q

r is higher. To ensure that q

r < 1, we assume
that the legal cost is not too large; that is, L < cr=(1  p): The auditor's expected payo is
E[U(q; Fm)] = [F

m   (1  qh )(1  p)L  ch (qh )]
+(1  )[F m   (1  ql )(1  p)L  cl (ql )] = 0:
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In equilibrium, the auditor expects to break even, so the audit fee is given by F m = wh+(1 )wl;
where wr  (1  qr)(1  p)L+ cr (qr). Substituting into qr = (1  p)L=cr, the audit fee is
F m =
(1  p)L
2chcl
f2chcl   (1  p)[cl + (1  )ch]Lg :
Taking derivatives, we can show
@F m
@L
=
1  p
chcl
[chcl   L(1  p)(cl+ ch(1  ))] > 0;
@F m
@ch
=
(1  p)2L2
2c2h
> 0;
@F m
@cl
=
(1  )(1  p)2L2
2c2l
> 0;
@F m
@
=
(ch   cl) (1  p)2L2
2chcl
> 0;
@F m
@p
=   L
chcl
[chcl   L(1  p)(cl+ ch(1  ))] < 0:
The investors' expected payo is given by V (; I) = Pr(Gjg)R   I = 0: Investors demand a
fraction  of the project return R, so that they will be break even:  = IPr(Gjg)R < 1: Given the
investors' posterior belief that
Pr(Gjg) = p
p+ (1  p)[(1  qh) + (1  )(1  ql)] ;
it can be shown that
 =
I
pR
[1  (1  p)(qh + (1  )ql )] ;
where the optimal audit eort qr = (1   p)L=cr. It is straightforward to obtain the following
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derivatives:
@
@ch
=
I(1  p)2L
pRc2h
> 0;
@
@cl
=
(1  )I(1  p)2L
pRc2l
> 0;
@
@
=
I(1  p)2(ch   cl)L
pRchcl
> 0;
@
@L
=  I(1  p)
2(cl + (1  )ch)
pRchcl
< 0:

Proof of Proposition 4
Denote by F m the expected audit fee under mandatory auditor rotation, which is given by E[F m] =
wh + (1   )wl = w: In contrast, the expected audit fee under audit retendering from the rm's
perspective is
E[F r ] = E[FO] + E[FI ] = w + (1  )(wh   wl):
The dierence of the audit fees is given by
F  E[F r ]  E[F m] = (1  )(wh   wl);
which presents the incumbent auditor's information rent. 
Proof of Proposition 5
We now compare the informativeness of an audit report. First, because auditor rotation does not
convey any information, the investors' posterior belief is given by
Pr(Gjg) = p
p+ (1  p)[(1  qh) + (1  )(1  ql)] :
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Recall that when the audit report is issued by an entrant auditor, the investors' posterior beliefs
are characterized by
Pr(Gjg;O) = p[h + (1  )l]
[ph + (1  p)h(1  qh)] + (1  )[pl + (1  p)l(1  ql)]
=
p  
p  + (1  p)[h(1  qh) + (1  )l(1  ql)]
;
=
p
p+ (1  p)[h (1  qh) + l (1  )(1  ql)]
;
where  = h + (1   )l = (1   2)=2 is the probability of switching to the entrant auditor,
h = 1   , l = (1   )=2, and h >  > l. It follows immediately that Pr(Gjg;O) < Pr(Gjg)
because 1 > ql > q
I
h > qh. In contrast, when the audit report is issued by the incumbent auditor,
the investors' posterior beliefs are characterized by
Pr(Gjg; I) = p[(1  h) + (1  )(1  l)]
[p(1  h) + (1  p)(1  h)(1  qIh)] + (1  )[p(1  l) + (1  p)(1  l)(1  ql)]
;
=
p(1  )
p(1  ) + (1  p)[(1  h)(1  qIh) + (1  )(1  l)(1  ql)]
;
=
p
p+ (1  p)[1 h1  (1  qIh) + (1  )1 l1  (1  ql)]
;
where 1   = (1  h) + (1  )(1  l). Similarly, given that h > l and 1 > ql > qIh > qh, it is
shown that Pr(Gjg; I) > Pr(Gjg).
Under audit retendering, the expected informativeness of the auditor's report is
E[Pr(Gjg)] = p
p+ (1  p)f[h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh)] + (1  )(1  ql)g
:
Note that if the incumbent does not have a knowledge advantage, then qIh ! qh and the expected
informativeness E[Pr(Gjg)] under audit retendering is the same as that under mandatory auditor
rotation. However, as long as the incumbent has a knowledge advantage, then it follows that
h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh) < (1  qh); suggesting that E[Pr(Gjg)] > Pr(Gjg). 
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Proof of Proposition 6 and Corollary 4
Under the mandatory rotation regime, the client rm's expected payo is
Wm(

m; F

m) = p(1  m)R  E[F m]
= p(R  I)  (1  p)[(1  qh) + (1  )(1  ql)]I   E[F m]:
In contrast, the client's rm's expected payo under the retendering regime,
Wr(

r ; F

r ) = p(1  E[r ])R  E[F r ]
= p(R  I)  (1  p)f[h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh)] + (1  )(1  ql)gI   E[F r ];
where h = GO(wh) = 1   : Thus the dierence of the rm's expected payo between these two
regimes is
W  Wr(r ; F r ) Wm(m; F m);
= (1  p)f[h(1  qh) + (1  h)(1  qIh)]  (1  qh)gI   (E[F r ]  E[F m]) ;
= [(1  p)(1  h)(qIh   qh)I   (1  )(wh   wl)]:
where the rst term represents the investment loss due to a type-II error and the second term
represents the incumbent auditor's information rent. Recall that wr  (1   qr)(1   p)L + cr (qr)
and qr = (1  p)L=cr. Substituting them into W , we can show that
wh   wl = L
2(1  p)2(ch   cl)
2chcl
:
Given h = 1   and qIh = (1  p)L=cIh, it follows that
W = L(1  p)2

I(ch   cIh)
chc
I
h
  (1  )L(ch   cl)
2chcl

:
It is straightforward to show that the rm's expected payo is higher under audit retendering,
ceteris paribus, when the information asymmetry is smaller (i.e., the dierence ch and cl is smaller),
the incumbent auditor's knowledge advantage is larger (i.e., a smaller cIh), and when the required
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investment I is larger:
@W
@I
=
2(1  p)2(ch   cIh)
chc
I
h
> 0;
@W
@cIh
=  
2(1  p)2LI
(cIh)
2
< 0:
When the control risk is more likely to be high (a high ), the incumbent's information rent is
smaller, suggesting that the client rm is more likely to benet from audit retendering:
@W
@
=
L(1  p)2  clcIh(L  2(2I + L)) + ch (4Icl + (2  1)Lkh)
2chclc
I
h
> 0:
The eect of the legal cost is not clear. Taking a partial derivative yields
@W
@L
=
(1  p)2  clcIh(L  (I + L)) + ch (Icl   (1  )Lkh)
chclc
I
h
:
It can be shown that there exists a threshold
I =
(1  )L (ch   cl) cIh
cl
 
ch   cIh
 ;
such that for I > I; @W=@L > 0. 
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